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Abstract
A horizontal merger is unlikely to be profitable unless it involves
the large majority of firms in an industry. This well established result
was developed by Salant et al (1983) in a closed economy setting. The
present paper studies the profitability of mergers in an open economy.
A cross-border merger provides the acquiring firm with market access.
If alternative modes of market entry are suﬃciently costly, a merger
may indeed be profitable. The relationship between entry costs and
the profitability of merger is, however, not a monotonic one. An in-
crease in entry costs may cause a change in the optimal entry mode
of rival firms such that a merger may be unprofitable even for higher
entry costs. The paper also derives results regarding the nationality
of the acquiring firm.
JEL classification: F15, F21, F23, L12, L13
Keywords: Trade; Foreign direct investment; Mergers and acquisi-
tions
1 Introduction
It is well known from the literature on mergers that it is generally more
profitable to be outside a merger than to participate in it, see Stiegler (1950).
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In a Cournot model with symmetric firms, Salant et al. (1983) show that a
merger involving less than 80 percent of the industry will not be profitable.
The reason is that the outside firms will “steal business” from the merging
parties.1 Due to the business stealing eﬀect, the profits of the merged firm
may be less than the combined pre-merger profits of the merging parties,
thus violating the traditional theoretical criterion for a merger to take place.
In light of these results, the fact that a large number of mergers actually
take place is rather surprising. There are two main explanations to this puz-
zle. First, mergers may be guided by other objectives than profits. Second,
mergers may give rise to cost synergies that are not captured by the standard
models referred to above.
The present paper maintains the assumption of profit maximization, and
studies the cost synergies that arise from cross-border mergers. Acquiring
a firm in a foreign market may function as a mode of entry, thus bringing
additional gains to the merging parties relative to a single-market context.2
If alternative modes of market entry, which here means exports or greenfield
investment, are suﬃciently costly, a merger may indeed be profitable to the
merging parties. The relationship between entry costs and the profitability
of merger is, however, not a monotonic one. An increase in entry costs that
changes the optimal entry mode of rival firms may turn the profitability of a
merger from positive to negative.
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have increased sharply in recent
years. In the second half of the 1990s the yearly growth was close to 50
percent, reaching USD 720 billion in over 6000 deals at the end of that decade,
see UNCTAD (2000).3 The economic literature on cross-border mergers is
however relatively small. Most of it is normative, analysing the welfare eﬀects
of mergers and policy implications, see for instance Barros and Cabral (1994)
and Horn and Levinsohn (1997). The present paper addresses the positive
issue of equilibrium market structure, and is related to Horn and Persson
(2001), Norbäck and Persson (2001 a,b), Görg (1999).
The distinguishing feature of the present paper relative to the existing lit-
1To illustrate the business stealing eﬀect, consider a single market with three symmetric
firms. Initially, each firm supplies one third of the market. When two firms merge, the
number of players is reduced to two. As a result of the merger, the outside firm has
expanded its market share to fifty percent.
2The terms merger and acquisition will be treated as synonyms.
3As noted in UNCTAD (2000), the great majority of the deals listed as mergers and
acquisitions are in fact acquisitions.
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erature on cross-border mergers is the focus on the profitability of a merger.
Horn and Persson (2001) analyse equilibrium market structure, focussing
on whether mergers cross borders or not. The main result of their paper
is that an increase in trade costs may increase the profitability of domes-
tic mergers relative to cross-border mergers. The intuition is basically that
when trade costs are high, a domestic merger results in national monopolies,
which is more profitable than a cross border merger resulting in an inter-
national duopoly. They do not analyse the possibility of mergers not being
profitable to the involved parties. Moreover, they do not consider greenfield
as alternative entry mode.
Norbäck and Persson (2001a) consider the case of privatization. Given
that a firm is for sale, they ask who will purchase the firm. As in Horn and
Persson, they show that when trade costs are high, the firm located in the
same market as the firm for sale will be the buyer. Allowing for greenfield
investment, they also demonstrate that when greenfield costs are low, the
price of the privatized firm will be low and the foreign firm will end up buying
it. The intuition is basically the following: The only reason why the local firm
should buy the privatized firm is to avoid entry through acquisition by the
foreign firm. But if greenfield costs are low, the most profitable alternative to
acquisition for the foreign firm is greenfield. Hence, the local firm has nothing
to gain from buying the firm for sale. Low greenfield costs therefore lead to
foreign acquisition. Again, in their paper the possibility of an acquisition not
being profitable is not an issue. The reason is basically that the reservation
price of the privatized firm is assumed to be zero, so that there will always
be a buyer.4
Finally, Görg (2000) analyses the choice between acquisition and green-
field. He abstracts from exports as possible entry mode and, by considering
only a two-firm case, does not address the issue of possible losses from the
acquisition due to business stealing eﬀects from outside firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
section 3 the analysis. Section 4 concludes.
4In a related paper, Norbäck and Persson (2001b) focus on the welfare eﬀects of foreign
acquisitions.
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2 The model
Consider a market where demand for the homogenous good Q is given by
Q = 1− p, (1)
where p is the price. The market can be supplied by local firms and
by firms located elsewhere. We shall refer to the latter as foreign firms.
Operating profits for a firm i are given by
πi = (p− si)Qi, (2)
where si is marginal sales costs for firm i. Assuming Cournot competition
between firms, equilibrium operating profits can be found as5
πi =
(1− nsi +
P
sk)
2
(n+ 1)2
, k 6= i, (3)
where n is the number of firms competing in this market. A foreign firm
has three modes of servicing the market. First, it may acquire a firm already
located there. This is the acquisition strategy A. Second, it may enter by
investing in a new production plant at a fixed cost f . This is the greeenfield
strategy G. Third, it may choose exports at a per unit trade cost t, which we
shall call strategy X. Finally, the firm may choose not to serve the market
at all, which we call strategy 0.
The sequence of moves is as follows. At stage one, firms simultaneously
decide on whether or not to invest, and in case of investment, whether to
choose strategy A or G. At stage two, there is production and sales, with
Cournot-competition between the firms.
To study the issue at hand, it suﬃces to consider three firms, call them
a, b and c. Let c be the target firm, located in the market in question.
Marginal production costs are assumed to be identical across firms, and are
normalized to zero. Note that in the closed economy context studied by
Salant et al (1983), a merger between a pair of firms in the symmetric triopoly
case would not be profitable. In line with the literature, we ignore the trivial
case of the three firms merging to form a monopoly. We can think of such
monopolization as being prohibited by competition policy.
5See Appendix A for a derivation.
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The standard criterion for a merger to take place is that there is an
increase in the joint profits to the insiders of a merger. Let π∗j define the
post-merger operating profits of the merged entity when firm j = a, b is the
merging partner with c, and let Πj define net profits, i.e., net of any fixed
investment cost f , in the absence of a merger. The change in joint profits to
the merging parties caused by the merger is thus given by
µj ≡ π∗j − Πj − πc. (4)
A merger will be assumed to take place between j and c only if µj > 0.
In terms of an acquisition, µj > 0 can be interpreted as saying that the
acquiring firm j will place a bid on the target firm c only if j’s reservation
price,
¡
π∗j − Πj
¢
, exceeds the reservation price of c, πc. Note that the present
paper focuses on the incentive to merge. I shall therefore limit myself to
answering the question whether we can expect an acquisition to take place
or not (i.e., whether µj is positive or not) and not address the question of
what the acquisition price will be if indeed µj is positive.
Operating profits for the possible combinations of entry modes for two
foreign firms are derived from (3) and are summarized in Table 1.6
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Entry costs aﬀect profits, and thereby µj, through two channels. First,
a change in entry costs aﬀects profits for a given set of entry modes. For
instance, higher trade costs lowers profits for an exporting firm and raises
profits for a local firm. Second, a change in entry costs may alter firms’
choice of entry mode. For instance, higher trade costs may induce a firm to
6To save space, we have not included the payoﬀs for the situation where the vertical
player is the acquiring firm. These payoﬀs would, however, be entirely similar to the
horizontal player’s acquisition payoﬀs.
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choose greenfield rather than exports, leading to a reduction in the profits of
a local firm.
In order to determine the sign of µj, we have to derive the equilibrium
entry strategies. For the relevant entry strategies we can then derive critical
values of entry costs at which the sign of µj changes. The discussion of the
two scenarios will be based on two figures, one for each scenario, with the
calculations underlying the figures reported in Appendices B and C. The axes
of the figures measure entry costs: On the vertical axis is the fixed greenfield
cost f , and on the horizontal axis is the per unit trade cost t.
In terms of notation, each area in the figures is assigned a roman number
and letters describing the equilibrium entry mode. The letters in parenthesis
give the equilibrium entry mode in the no-merger case. For instance, (GG)
means that both foreign firms in the absence of merger would choose green-
field investment, and (XG) that one firm chooses exports, the other green-
field. Letters preceding a parenthesis refers to entry mode when a merger
takes place. Hence, AX (XX) means that the equilibrium outcome is one
in which one firm acquires c, the optimal response of the outside firm being
exports. Moreover, the parenthesis indicates that in the absence of a merger,
both foreign firms would have chosen exports.
When studying cross-border mergers in our three-firm model, there are
two relevant initial market structures to analyse. In scenario 1, both a and
b are located abroad, facing the same trade and greenfield costs. We shall
call this the symmetric case. This scenario allows us inter alia to analyse
how the profitability of a merger is aﬀected by the response of the outside
firm, i.e., the firm not involved in the merger. In the second scenario, only
one firm is located abroad, with the other two already being established in
the market in question. We shall refer to this as the asymmetric case. An
interesting issue in this second scenario is the question of who will buy firm
c, i.e., the foreign or the local firm.
3 Scenario 1. The symmetric case
It is instructive to start the analysis by asking what the alternative to a
merger is. The equilibrium market structure in the no-merger case brings
no great surprises. Basically, when trade costs are low relative to greenfield
costs (areas I, IV , V I), the foreign firms choose exports, and when trade
costs are high (areas II, V II), they choose greenfield. In the central areas
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III, V III, and V , there is room for only one greenfield investor; in III and
V III the optimal response of the rival is to choose exports, and in V to stay
out of the market.7 The MM -curve shows combinations of investment and
trade costs above which an entrant, in case he meets a single local producer
in the foreign market, chooses exports and below which he chooses greenfield.
This information is relevant if the rival chooses to stay out of the market or
acquires firm c. The horizontal axis is bounded above by t = 0.5, at which
point profits for two foreign exporters are zero.
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t
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
f
I
II
IV
III
V
AG(GG)
AX(XX)
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Figure 1: Scenario 1. The symmetric case
We now have the information we need on no-merger market structure and
can turn to the main issue, namely the profitability of merger. In the figure,
the shaded areas I−V are combinations of greenfield costs and trade costs for
which µj ≤ 0 and hence where a merger will not take place. Not surprisingly,
7We limit ourselves to studying equilibria in pure strategies.
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with zero entry costs there will be no merger since we are eﬀectively in the
single market setting studied by Salant et al (1983). The same is true for
regions I − III characterized by low entry costs. However, starting in the
low-cost areas I − III, we find that:
Proposition 1 An increase in entry costs, in the form of higher greenfield
investment costs or trade costs, may make a cross-border merger profitable.
Proof. From Figure 1, with derivations in Appendix B2, we see that
an increase in entry costs, moving the economy from I to V I, from II to
V II, from III to V II or V III, results in the profitability of an acquisition
turning from negative to positive.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: An increase in entry costs
related to trade and investment increases the attractiveness of acquisition
as a cost eﬀective way of entering foreign markets. While an increase in
trade costs and greenfield costs may induce a cross-border merger, this is not
necessarily the case. From Figure 1 we see that:
Proposition 2 An increase in entry costs that causes a change in the entry
mode of the rival firm may turn the profitability of a merger from positive to
negative.
Proof. From Figure 1, with derivations in Appendix B2, we see that
an increase in entry costs, moving the economy to V , or from V I or V III
to IV , results in the profitability of an acquisition turning from positive to
negative.
This proposition is less intuitive, and requires some elaboration. Consider
first an increase in greenfield costs such that the economy moves from V II
to V . This brings about a change in the no-merger market structure from
(GG) to (0G). This means that in V the equilibrium market structure would
be the same with or without a merger, in both cases characterized by two
producers located in the market. There is therefore no potential gain from a
merger. Since no firm would spend money on acquiring firm c, the outcome
is characterized by no-merger equilibrium (0G). An increase in trade costs
causing a shift from V I or V III to V has an entirely similar eﬀect.
Consider next an increase in greenfield costs that takes us from V III to
IV , with the associated change in no-merger entry strategies from (XG) to
(XX). This change makes the merger unprofitable by making the alternative
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to merger more profitable: Without a merger, the response of the rival would
be the fairly ”soft” choice of exports, while a merger would trigger the more
”aggressive” response of greenfield from the rival.
Similarly, an increase in trade costs that brings us from V I to IV also
results in negative profits from merger. Here, the no-merger market structure
remains the same, namely (XX). What changes is the optimal response to
a merger by the outside firm, from exports to greenfield. By intensifying
post-merger competition, this makes a merger less attractive to the merging
parties.
Finally, a few words on the profitability of being an insider versus an
outsider to the merger in this symmetric case. Appendix B3 shows that it
is generally more profitable to be outside the merger. The exception to this
rule is for t > 1
3
in region V I and in region IX. Here, the cost saving eﬀect
is suﬃciently strong, and the business stealing eﬀect suﬃciently weak (due
to the optimal choice of the outside firm being exports) to make the insider
better oﬀ than the outsider. In areas V II and V III, a first mover would
choose G, leaving the acquisition to the second mover. Trivially, a first mover
would also choose G in area V , thus forming a duopoly with firm c.
4 Scenario 2: The asymmetric case
In this version of the model we explore the consequences of an asymmetry
between a and b in terms of their initial location. For concreteness, let b and
c be located in the same market with a being the only foreign firm. In this
case, market entry is of course an issue only for firm a. This allows us to
deal with the issue of the nationality of the acquiring firm. When should we
expect to see cross-border mergers and when are mergers between two firms
located in the same market more profitable?
Figure 2 illustrates the outcome of this scenario, with the algebra pre-
sented in Appendix D. The no-merger equilibrium market structure is rel-
atively straightforward. Again, low trade costs relative to greenfield costs
leads to exports (areas I, V and V I), whereas high trade costs relative to
greenfield costs leads to investment (areas II and V II). When the cost of
both kinds of entry are high, the potential entrant stays out (areas III, IV ,
and V III).
Turning to mergers, we can derive the same kind of results as in Scenario
1: Increased entry costs may make a merger profitable, but not necessarily so.
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Figure 2: Scenario 2. The asymmetric case
Hence, propositions 1 and 2 apply also to this scenario. The most important
insight derived from the present scenario relates to the buyer of c. The
general insight can be stated as:
Proposition 3 A cross-border merger brings the added gain of market access
and is therefore generally more profitable than a merger between two firms
located in the same market.
Proof. See Appendix C
The reason why the foreign firm a is more likely to merge with c than is
the local firm, b, is of course that for a an acquisition brings the additional
gain of market entry. There is, however, an exception to this general insight,
which can be stated as:
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Proposition 4 When entry costs are suﬃciently high, a merger is profitable
only between two firms located in the same market.
Proof. See Appendix C
In area V III the local firm is the only one with an incentive to merge.
The reason is as follows. As noted above, in regions III, IV , and V III,
the optimal no-merger strategy of a is not to service the market. Since an
acquisition by a would essentially replace one local duopoly with another,
there is no gain from such a move. The question is therefore whether firm
b will choose acquisition or not. For suﬃciently high trade costs, namely in
region V III, firm b finds it profitable to spend money on acquiring c, the
advantage for b being that it thus replaces a local competitor with a foreign
based one, a fact which softens the competitive pressure on b.8
5 Concluding remarks
The present paper analyses the incentives to undertake cross-border merg-
ers. Relative to the analysis of mergers in a single market, the geographical
dimension adds the issue of market entry to the analysis. An increase in
trade costs and/or greenfield costs increases the profitability of acquisition
as a mode of market entry and may thus increase the gains from horizontal
mergers.
There is, however, no monotone relationship between entry costs and the
profitability of cross-border mergers. The reason is that a change in entry
costs may induce a change in the entry mode of the rival firm. For instance,
an increase in trade costs that changes the optimal entry mode of the outside
firm from exports to greenfield, increases the business stealing eﬀect and may
render an acquisition unprofitable.
The analysis also demonstrates that mergers are more likely to take place
between firms located in diﬀerent markets than between firms located in
the same market. The reason is, as noted above, that a cross-border merger
brings with it the additional gain of market access to the foreign firm. Hence,
the willingness to pay for a firm in a specific location is generally higher for
8This result is essentially the same as that found in Horn and Persson (2001) referred to
in the introduction: Abstracting from greenfield investment (which in region V III is true
because of high greenfield costs), an increase in trade costs results in a domestic merger.
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a foreign than a local firm. However, when entry costs are suﬃciently high,
a merger may be profitable only between two local firms.
The analytical framework in which the issue of cross-border mergers has
been analysed here is certainly not a general one. However, the mechanisms
presented in this relatively simple model are fairly intuitive, and should be
present also in a more complex model. Indeed, Salant et al (1983) report that
the loss-from-merger result can also arise in more complex Nash equilibrium
models, with diﬀerentiated products, increasing marginal costs, and so on.
Naturally, allowing for new entry following a merger would make the merger
less profitable. But if we believe that increased market concentration is an
important motivation for mergers, the Cournot model without additional
entry may be realistic.
One suggestion for future research is to analyse welfare implications of
the model. Another is to analyse the consequences of the outcome when
there are asymmetries in firms’ technologies.
Appendix A Derivation of equation (3).
Combining (1) and (2), firm i profits can be expressed as
πi =
³
1−
X
Qk − si
´
Qi. (A1)
Maximizing this expression with respect to Qi, taking as given all Qk,
k 6= i, we get the first order condition
Qi = 1− si −
X
Qk. (A2)
Since this condition must hold for all n producers, we have
X
Qk = n−
X
sk − n
X
Qk, (A3)
which can be written as:
(n+ 1)
X
Qk = n−
X
sk. (A4)
Using (A2), we can express (A4) as
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1 +
X
sk = (n+ 1) (Qi + si) , (A5)
which in turn can be expressed as
Qi =
1− (n+ 1) si +
P
sk
n+ 1
, (A6)
The equilibrium price can be found by using (A4) into the demand func-
tion (1), resulting in
(1− p) (1 + n) = n−
X
sk,
which in turn can be expressed as
p =
1 +
P
sk
n+ 1
. (A7)
Equilibrium profits can be found by using (A6) and (A7) in the profit
function (2). This yields
πi =
µ
1 +
P
sk
n+ 1
− si
¶µ
1− (n+ 1) si +
P
sk
n+ 1
¶
,
which simplifies to
πi =
(1− (n+ 1) si +
P
sk)
2
(n+ 1)2
, (A8)
which can be written as
πi =
(1− nsi +
P
sk)
2
(n+ 1)2
, k 6= i. (A9)
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Appendix B: Scenario 1 (The symmetric case)
B1. The no-merger case
From Table 1 we can derive the critical values of entry costs at which
equilibrium market structures change. A word on notation: ΠX|Gmeans net
profits from exports, given that the rival foreign firm has chosen greenfield.
Similarly for the other entry modes. For instance, from ΠX|G = ΠG|G we
can find the border between the (XG) and the (GG) market structures.
Π0|0 = ΠX|X : 0 = (1−2t)2
16
⇒ t = 1
2
Π0|0 = ΠG|0 : 0 = 1
9
− f ⇒ f = 1
9
Π0|G = ΠG|G : 0 = 1
16
− f ⇒ f = 1
16
Π0|G = ΠX|G : 0 = (1−3t)2
16
⇒ t = 1
3
ΠX|G = ΠG|G : (1−3t)2
16
= 1
16
− f ⇒ f = 3
8
t− 9
16
t2
ΠG|X = ΠX|X : (1+t)2
16
− f = (1−2t)2
16
⇒ f = 3
8
t− 3
16
t2
ΠX|0 = ΠG|0 : (1−2t)2
9
= 1
9
− f ⇒ f = 4
9
t− 4
9
t2 (The MM-curve)
B2. The profitability of merger
Notation: Let the profitability of acquisition, given that the optimal re-
sponse of the outside firm is exports, and given that the no-merger case is
characterized by exports by both foreign firms, be given by µ [AX (XX)] ≡
πA|X − ΠX|X − πc|XX, where πc|XX is the payoﬀ to c given that both
foreign firms choose exports. Similarly for other the other entry modes.
µ [AX (XX)] = (1+t)
2
9
− (1−2t)2
16
− (1+2t)2
16
< 0 for t < 1
14
(Area I)
µ [AG (GG)] = 1
9
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16
− f¢− 1
16
< 0 for f < 1
72
(Area II)
µ [AG (XG)] = 1
9
− (1−3t)2
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− (1+t)2
16
< 0 for t < 1
15
(Area III)
µ [AG (XX)] = 1
9
− (1−2t)2
16
− (1+2t)2
16
< 0 for all t (Area IV )
µ [AG (0G)] = 1
9
− 0− 1
9
= 0 (Area V )
B3. Profitability of insider vs. outsider
µ [AX (XX)] > ΠX|A : (1+t)2
9
− (1−2t)2
16
− (1+2t)2
16
> (1−2t)
2
9
for t > 3
10
(Area
V I)
µ [AX (XX)] < ΠX|A : (1+t)2
9
− (1−2t)2
16
− (1+2t)2
16
< (1−2t)
2
9
for t < 3
10
(Area
V I)
µ [AX (XG)] > ΠX|A : (1+t)2
9
− (1−3t)2
16
− (1+t)2
16
> (1−2t)
2
9
for all relevant t
(Area IX)
14
µ [AG (XG)] < ΠG|A : 1
9
− (1−3t)2
16
− (1+t)2
16
< 1
9
for all relevant t (Area
V III)
µ [AG (GG)] < ΠG|A : 1
9
− ¡ 1
16
− f¢ − 1
16
< 1
9
for all relevant f (Area
V II)
Appendix C: Scenario 2 (The asymmetric case)
All critical values and functions can be found from Scenario 1, just keep-
ing in mind the fact the asymmetry of initial location. Hence, the definition
of the border between (X) and (G) is identical to the one defining the bor-
der between (XG) and (GG) in Scenario 1; the condition µ [A (X)] < 0 is
identical to µ [AG (XG)] < 0 in Scenario 1, and so on.
Generally, it is not profitable for the local firm to acquire c. The exception
is area V III, as shown below.
µ [AX (X)] = (1+t)
2
9
− (1+t)2
16
− (1+t)2
16
< 0 for all relevant t (Area V )
µ [AG (X)] = 1
9
− (1+t)2
16
− (1+t)2
16
< 0 for all relevant t (Area V I)
µ [AG (G)] = 1
9
− 1
16
− 1
16
< 0 (Area V II)
µ [AX (0)] = (1+t)
2
9
− 1
9
− 1
9
< 0 for t < . 414 21 (Area IV )
µ [AX (0)] = (1+t)
2
9
− 1
9
− 1
9
> 0 for t > . 414 21 (Area V III)
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